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Wages in traditional agrarian societies are often observed to be above reseravtion wages
even in the slack season when markets are in a state of excess labour supply. Models of non-
cooperative wage setting by landlords which explicitly take account of the costs of supervising
hired labour and emphasize worker heterogeneity are developed and analysed. Both symmetric
and asymmetric information cases are considered. Conditions are given for the existence of
competitive equilibria and their relationship to Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria are shown to
be more likely to exist. Nash equilibria exhibit wage dispersion and involuntary unemployment
or underemployment with identical workers earning di®erent wage rates.
Key Words: Wages, Involuntary unemployment, Underemployment, Supervision costs.
1From August 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997. An earlier version of this paper was presented at The Economic
Policy Research Unit of the University of Copenhagen Business School. Helpful comments of the participants are
gratefully acknowledged. This research was supported by Concordia University and the Institute of Economics,
University of Copenhagen. To them go my sincere thanks.1 Introduction
One of the features of third world rural labour markets is the presence of high unemployment
rates in the o®-peak seasons. In addition, as a number of authors have noted, wage rates for
casual or landless labour tend to be less than fully °exible in response to changing seasonal
demands for labour. Consequently, unemployment is involuntary and the unemployed can not
improve their position by o®ering to work for less or by looking harder for work. The plight of
landless labour is, in fact, one of the most distressing problems facing less developed countries.2
While there seems to be little disagreement among scholars who study these markets that they
are characterized by substantial periods of involuntary unemployment there is considerable
variety in terms of potential explanations of the causes of such phenomena.
This paper examines the theory of agricultural labour markets. The next section brie°y
surveys the literature in this area.3 There are a number of papers which attempt to explain
wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment as products of the behaviour of rational optimizing
agents. Two such classes of model are discussed here. These are variations on \e±ciency
wage" models and labour bargaining models. This discussion reveals certain limitations in the
established theory of agricultural labour markets and the need for a new class of model to
be developed. This is done in Section (3) in a model which explicitly considers supervision
costs and permits workers to be paid wages which re°ect the observable characteristics that
determine their productivity.4 Section (4) contains a summary and a discussion of the main
results.
2Dr¶ eze and Sen (1989, p. 5) describe it in the following way: \People who possess no means of production
excepting their own labour power, which they try to sell for a wage in order to an adequate income to buy enough
food, are particularly vulnerable to changes in labour market conditions. A decline in wages vis-µ a-vis food prices,
or an increase in unemployment, can spell disaster for this class. .... The class of landless wage labourers
has indeed recurrently produced famine victims in modern times. For example, in the Indian subcontinent, the
majority of famine victims in this century and the last has come from this group.
3Dr¶ eze and Mukherjee (1989) provide an excellent survey of research on labour markets in the Indian sub-
continent. They list a number of \stylized facts" for casual labour markets (page 246) the ¯rst four of which are:
\(1) Casual labour is the most important type of labour contract. It is generally hired on a day to day basis.
(2) Search on the casual labour market is usually carried out on the previous night by employers who usually
`call' on the evening preceding the execution of the work. (3) The village labour market is largely closed; labour
hiring across nieghbouring villages is rare. (4) Involuntary unemployment is common, particularly during the
slack agricultural season. Less productive workers are especially vulnerable to forced leisure."
4These are important features of casual agricultural labour markets as the following description of the hiring
process for daily rate labour by Walker and Ryan (1992, p. 110) shows. \In Sholapur, employers look for more
e±cient and reliable workers ¯rst and o®er premiums. Workers who have to approach prospective employers
generally accept discounted wages. ...Employees are willing to work for almost all employers and they regularly
change their employer throughout the year." See Foster and Rosenzwieg (1993, Table 7 p. 777) for empirical
support for this proposition. A paper that considers the problems that arise with worker heterogeneity is
McIntosh (1984). Unfortunately the model developed there does not consider the possibility of involuntaury
unemployment or underemployment.
12 Theoretical Wage Models
Among endogenous explanations of involuntary unemployment e±ciency wage models are per-
haps the most well known. Although, there are quite a large number of papers on this topic only
a small sub-sample will be considered here. There are two versions, one based on nutritional
requirements, the other on employer inability to determine individual worker productivity.5 In
the nutrition based version worker productivity is determined by consumption which is in turn
determined by the worker's wage. Workers with very low wages do not have physical strength
and stamina to main high e®ort or productivity levels. Raising wages does alleviate this prob-
lem, however, and consequently there is a link between wages and productivity. Under certain
not unreasonable assumptions there exists a lower bound on the wage rate, the e±ciency wage.
If farmers pay wages below this rate their pro¯ts actually fall because worker e±ciency falls and
reduces revenue more than wage costs. Even when there is an excess supply of labour at this
wage farmers prefer to pay the e±ciency wage rather than let the wage fall to clear the mar-
ket. This is what Dasgupta and Ray (1986, p. 1024) describe as a competitive non-Walrasian
equilibrium in which there is involuntary unemployment.
The same outcome is obtained in the asymmetric model, but the mechanism is quite
di®erent. When farmers can not observe the characteristics which determine the productivity
of farm labour they can not discriminate on this basis and thus must pay a common wage
to everyone they employ. If farms are identical then all farms must pay the same wage rate.
Individuals di®er not only with respect to their ability but have di®erent reservation wages
which usually are assumed to be positively correlated with their ability. Since workers enter
the labour market only if their reservation wage is at least as great as the market wage average
productivity increases with the wage rate.
An e±ciency wage can arise in this case and will be supported by farmers if reductions
in the wage by driving the highest productivity workers out of the market reduce average
productivity more than wage costs. As already mentioned, the causal mechanism is based on
the presence asymmetric information and while both versions of the model are characterized by
involuntary unemployment this version is immune to the criticism leveled against the nutrition
based version that this was a longer term relationship and that individual farmers had no
incentive to pay the e±ciency wage since they would not likely reap the bene¯ts. However, the
validity of this type of model really does depend on there being asymmetries in the distribution
of information about worker characteristics.
What farmers know about the labour which they employ is an empirical question. There
may be situations where there is less than perfect information about worker characteristics in
which case this version of the model is relevant.6
5For the ¯rst type see Stiglitz (1976), Bliss and Stern (1978) and Dasgupta and Ray (1986) and Basu (1994).
The asymmetric information model which has the same structural properties as the nutrition based models was
¯rst developed by Weiss (1980) and is discussed in some detail in chapter 13 of Mas-Colell et al (1995).
6Foster and Rosenzwieg (1996, p. 368) in their study of Philippine labour markets show that less than half
the variation in worker productivity is explained by what farmer employers know.
2A radically di®erent approach is adopted by Mukherjee and Ray (1992) who see the deter-
mination of wages as the outcome of con°ict or bargaining between land-owning farmers and
landless labourers. There are two periods representing the slack and peak seasons. There is
surplus labour in the slack season and wages are low. Workers have opinions as to what a \fair
wage" is and when the peak season arrives they remember which farmers paid fair wages and
those which did not. In the peak season those farmers which paid unfair wages in the slack
season experience higher recruitment costs due to refusals by workers who thought their slack
season wages were unfair. To avoid this costly situation farmers have an incentive to pay more
than reservation wages in the slack season. The authors propose a Nash equilibrium which
farms of di®erent size pay possibly di®erent wages which and these minimize total expected
two period costs by paying more than reservation wages in the slack season to reduce expected
recruitment costs in the peak season.
Now there are two problems with this model. The ¯rst the is credibility of the behaviour
of landless peasants. For workers who must survive a large number of two season years is
it reasonable to assume that they would threaten a landlord by refusing to work for him in
the peak season because he paid low wages in the previous slack season and risk the possible
retaliation of this landlord in the following slack season? This possibility is assumed away
because there are only two periods but it is a problem nonetheless. Secondly, the emphasis on
intertemporal considerations gives the model a seasonal interdependence that runs counter to
what many observers report.
Another type of bargaining model is considered by Osmani (1991, p. 6) who believes \
...that it is the workers rather than employers who resist the wage rate from being pushed
down to the competitive level." He sees the modelling of casual labour markets as a repeated
non-cooperative game between a group of homogenous peasant workers and a group of passive
landlords. Given this representation of the casual labour market it is possible to show that all
slack season workers get a wage above their common reservation wage and this is sustained as
a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium with each worker following a \trigger strategy".
While there in nothing wrong with the logic of the model the plausibility of the assumptions
is another matter. As has already been noted, there are di®erentials across individuals that
a®ect both productivity and the probability of employment. While these can be accommodated
in a more general \trigger strategy" equilibria when farmers have no role to play in wage
determination, the situation is radically di®erent when they do. As the models developed in
the next section show, worker heterogeneity and the presence of supervision costs or not being
able to observe ability gives farmers an incentive to be selective with respect to their labour
force and to set wage rates accordingly.
The importance of supervision costs has long been appreciated by economists interested
in the study of traditional third world agriculture. It is fairly obvious that farmers expose
themselves to moral hazard problems if they do not monitor or direct hired labour because
of the incentives that wage earners have to either overstate their production in a piece-rate
system or shirk when they are being paid by the day. Frisvold (1994) in his study of Indian
farms provides convincing evidence that supervision improves the productivity of agricultural
3hired workers as well as brief survey of the theoretical literature on supervision costs. For
further discussion of this issue see Foster and Rosenzweig (1993, p. 763).
However, the implications of costly supervision have yet to be fully worked out. When
workers di®er by ability or productivity the presence of supervision costs as a function of farm
employment causes a number of things happen. First, the substitutability between di®erent
levels of ability is no longer solely determined by the characteristics of the individuals but
depends on the farms that could potentially employ them. It is well known that in competitive
markets workers with di®erent but observable productivities are paid wages which are equal to
these productivities. In many cases the competitive pricing of labour makes perfect substitutes
out of di®erent quality labour by making them equally costly to the employer.7 Secondly,
supervision costs are not part of the compensation package paid to labour although they must
be paid by the employer. This means that when there are supervision costs farms can improve
pro¯tability by hiring proportionately more high ability labour because the higher wage costs
are o®set by lower supervision costs. As will be seen in the models developed in the next section
this trade-o® can be accompanied by a subset of the farms specializing in high ability labour, the
subset being determined by the shape of the supervision cost function, and paying a premium
not only above reservation wages but above that justi¯ed by the di®erence in individual abilities.
There are also implications for employment. Higher wages generally lead to lower employ-
ment levels. This will turn out to be true for models based on supervision costs and like some
of the models referred to earlier in this section there will be involuntary underemployment or
unemployment and because the wage rates are chosen by farms those looking for work will be
unable to obtain it by bidding down the wage.
3 A Model of Slack Season Employment
Production in traditional agriculture is a continuous process throughout the crop cycle.
It culminates with the harvest; but in order for this to happen tasks have to be performed
at various times prior to harvesting. These include plowing, weeding, applying fertilizer and
pesticides, preparing irrigation ditches etc. The amount of work that has to be done at each
point in the crop cycle is assumed to be determined by the maximization of an intertemporal
objective function. Without specifying the precise nature of this procedure we assume that
farmer i has a number of tasks, qi; that have to be performed. Here time subscripts are
suppressed to simplify the notation but it should be remembered that these requirements vary
over time.
Starting with workers, we assume that they are characterized by their ability level, µ.
Workers can either work for wages if they can get acceptable employment with farmers in their
7See McIntosh (1984, p. 572) for examples.
4locality or they can work, possibly with other members of their family, in a house-hold mode
of production. A worker of type µ has a utility function
u(`;µ) = y(µ) ¡c(`;µ) (1)
In equation (1) ` is the amount of e®ort expended by the worker and y(µ) is the income
earned. For house-hold production this is generated by a concave house-hold production func-
tion, g(`µ); for a wage earner it is his wage, w(µ), which is also assumed to depend on the
worker's type. Here ability has a very simple interpretation. µ is a measure of e±ciency and
converts labour time into e±ciency units multiplicatively. The nominal value of utility is the
di®erence between income and the nominal disutility of working, c(`;µ). The following sign
pattern for the partial derivatives of c is assumed. c` > 0, c`` > 0, cµ < 0, c`µ < 0, and
Cµµ > 0.8
Individuals who are engaged in house-hold production choose an e®ort level which maxi-
mizes their utility and generates the following value function
V (µ) = max
`
[g(µ`) ¡c(`;µ)] (2)
Since farms have to compete with this alternative when they attempt to hire labour for wages
they must pay at least the reservation wage for a type µ which is
r(µ) = V(µ)+ c(1;µ) (3)
In the de¯nition of r(µ) it is assumed that workers involved in wage employment always provide
one unit of labour. Routine calculations using the fact that g00 < 0 and the assumed sign pattern
of the partial derivatives of c reveal that both V(µ) and r(µ) are increasing concave functions
of µ.
To simplify the analysis assume that there are just two types of worker: those with low
ability and those with high ability. It is assumed that workers are paid on a piece-rate basis
and that the number of pieces produced or the number of times a task is performed per day
by a type i worker is ¹(µi). For simplicity it will be assumed that ¹(µi) = µi so that in the
present context ability is synonymous with productivity. Let values of ability or productivity
be µL < µH and let niL and ni be the number of low and high ability labour hired at piece
8This representation of consumer behaviour is widely used in the literature on incentives. See, for example,
Mas-Colell et al (1995, p. 450), which is the source of much of the notation employed in this paper.
5rates (pL;p).9 Assuming that farms have only labour costs, a farm with a total piece-work
requirement of qi has labour costs of pLµLniL +pµHni +s(niL + ni) where niLµL +niµH = qi.
In the expression for labour costs, s is the cost of supervising the labour force. This depends
only on total employment and does not depend on ability levels. Clearly, s0 ¸ 0; although, the
second derivative of s may be of either sign depending on the particular type of work involved.
Given piece rates daily wage rates for each type of worker are wL = pLµL and w = pµH.
In what follows the analysis will by carried out in terms of the daily wage rates and qi will be
referred to as farm i0s demand. Furthermore, piece-rates will be allowed to vary across types
so that pL will be allowed to be di®erent from p. This may be more general than is required to
represent the payments systems that are actually used in agrarian labour markets. However, it
is important to see whether optimizing farms would gain from such a choice.
The problems that concern us in this paper are those involving wage determination when
there is \surplus labour" under varying scenarios concerning information availability and market
structure. The model developed in this section assumes that farms can observe an individual's
ability; that is, every worker's value of µ is observable to all employers.10 The market structure
is oligopsonistic; with a ¯nite number of farms bidding for labour. Farms compete with each
other in setting wages and employment levels. Labour is passive; workers act as individuals
and their strategies consist of either accepting or rejecting wage contracts. This is a game
of imperfect and complete information; play is simultaneous and there is no uncertainty, all
players are fully aware of other players characteristics and payo®s, and this fact is known to all
players.
We start by examining competitive equilibria when there are K farms with demands fq1 >
q2 ::: > qKg. As stated earlier, workers will work as paid labourers if the wage rate for their type
is at least as great as their reservation wage. Let NL and N be the number of low ability and
high ability workers, respectively, that are available for potential employment in the market.
Assume that N <
PK
i=1qi=µH so that an excess demand exists for high ability workers if all
farms wanted to employ only high ability workers. In all of what follows NL will be assumed
to be large in the sense that any farm will always be able to hire as many low ability workers
at r(µL) = rL as it wishes. This is what is meant by \surplus labour" in this model.
In a competitive market farms minimize costs, taking the wage rate for high ability workers,
w, as a parameter.
Let ni(qi;w) minimize
Ci(ni;w) = rL(qi ¡µHni)=µL + wni + s[(qi ¡µHni)=µL + ni] (4)
9For the moment it will be assumed that these piece-rate productivities do not involve incentive e®ects; that
is, they do not depend on the piece-rate paid to workers. De¯ning the piece-rate productivities as ¹(µ;pi) raises
interesting possibilities since it is not unreasonable to assume that workers would produce at a greater rate if
the rate per unit was higher. The implications of this are discussed in the next section.
10In section (4) the properties of this model are compared to those of model in which µ is unobservable.
6subject to the constraint
0 · ni · qi=µH: (5)
For future reference note that when ni(qi;w) is an interior solution to the minimization
problem above @ni(qi;w)=@qi > 0 and @ni(qi;w)=@w < 0.
De¯nition 1




ni(qi;w¤¤) = N (6)
andni(qi;w¤¤) = qi=µH if @Ci(qi=µH;w¤¤)=@ni < 0, 0 < ni(qi;w¤¤) < qi=µH, if @Ci(ni;w¤¤)=@ni =
0, and ni(qi;w¤¤) = 0 if @Ci(0;w¤¤)=@ni > 0.
The characteristics of the supervision cost function turn out to be important both for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium and the properties of Nash equilibria. Consequently, two
cases will be considered; one where s is convex and the other where s is concave. The case when
s is convex is considered ¯rst.
Theorem 1
Let j ¸ 2.11 If s00 > 0 and j is de¯ned by
Pj¡1
i=1 qi=µH < N <
Pj
i=1qi=µH a competitive
equilibrium exists and ni(qi;w¤¤) = qi=µH if i < j, 0 < nj(qj;w¤¤) < qj=µH, and ni(qi;w¤¤) = 0
if i > j.
Proof
Under the proposed equilibrium equation (7) can be written as nj(qj;w¤¤) = Nj where
Nj = N ¡
Pj¡1
i=1(qi=µH). De¯ne ¹ wi be the largest wage rate at which farm i can employ high
ability labour. Clearly, when s00 ¸ 0
¹ wi = rLµH=µL ¡s0(qi=µL)(1 ¡µH=µL) (7)
11The proof for the case when N < q1=µH is straightforward but requires di®erent notation.
7and is the wage rate that makes marginal cost equal to zero when ni = 0. Cost when each type
is paid its reservation wage is Ci(ni;rH). Now it follows from relatively simple calculations that
@Ci(ni;rH)=@ni = µH(rH=µH ¡rL=µL)+ s0(1¡ µH=µL) (8)
is negative. This follows from the concavity of r(µ) which makes (rH=µH ¡ rL=µL) < 0. Con-
sequently, nj(qj;rH) = qj=µH. The function Cj(nj;w) is continuous and convex since s00 ¸ 0.
Thus, nj(qj;w) maps the interval [rH; ¹ wj] continuously onto the interval [0;qj=µH]. Since
0 < Nj < qj=µH the continuity of nj guarantees that there exists w¤¤ for which nj(qj;w¤¤) = Nj
and w¤¤ < ¹ wj. And, of course, @Cj(nj(qj;w¤¤);w¤¤)=@nj = 0. However, there is only one farm
with an interior solution. To show this suppose in order to obtain a contradiction that farms
j and k have interior solutions. The consequence of this is that s0[(qj ¡ µHnj)=µL + nj] =
s0[(qk ¡ µHnk)=µL + nk]. But this can not happen generically unless qj = qk since ni is a
non-linear function of qi.
Since there can only be one farm with an interior solution, the marginal cost of farm (j-1)
must be either strictly positive or strictly negative for all values of nj¡1. Suppose that it is
positive. If this is the case then s0(qj¡1=µL)(1¡µH=µL) > s0[(qj ¡njµH)=µL+nj](1¡µH=µL) >
s0(qj=µL)(1¡µH=µL). However these inequalities imply that qj¡1 < qj contrary to assumption.
Hence the marginal cost of farm (j-1) must be negative making nj¡1 = qj¡1=µH the desired level
of employment. Since @2Ci(qi=µH;w¤¤)=@ni@qi < 0, farm i with i < (j-1) also has a negative
marginal cost. Furthermore, w¤¤ < ¹ wi when i < j since d ¹ wi=dqi = ¡s00(1¡µH=µL) > 0 so that
all farms with i < j can a®ord to pay w¤¤. Finally, it is possible to show using the same type
of argumentation that farm i for i > j has a positive marginal cost and prefers not to hire high
ability labour. Consequently, the proposed equilibrium satis¯es the conditions of the de¯nition
and is, therefore, a competitive equilibrium.
Having de¯ned a competitive equilibrium and demonstrated its existence for this model we
now examine Nash equilibria for wage setting behaviour in this model and establish conditions
when the two equilibria are the same. For expositional purposes it is simpler to derive these
results when there are only two farms.
At reservation wages, costs are minimized by employing only high ability workers, that is
when ni = qi=µH. However, this is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium only if the total quantity
of high ability workers is greater than the demand by both farms. When this condition does
not hold and there is not enough high ability labour for both farms, the equilibrium wage rate
paid by at least one farm for high ability workers will have to be set above the reservation wage,
r(µH) = rH.
The strategy spaces for each farm are the sets Si = f(ni;wi) 2 [0;qi=µH]-[rH; ¹ wi]g. Costs
for each farm are de¯ned in the following way using equation (4). Let ªfg be the indicator
function for the event contained in fg12. For w1 < w2 de¯ne
12ª(x : x ¸ 0) takes the value 1 if x ¸ 0 and the value 0 otherwise.
8C2(n1;w1;n2;w2) = C2(n2;w2) (9)
C1(n1;w1;n2;w2) = C1(n1;w1) ¤ ªfn1 : n1 · min[q1=µH;N ¡n2(q2;w2)]g (10)
Likewise, for w2 < w1
C1(n1;w1;n2;w2) = C1(n1;w1) (11)
C2(n1;w1;n2;w2) = C2(n2;w2) ¤ ªfn2 : n2 · min[q2=µH;N ¡n1(q1;w1)]g (12)
And, ¯nally, for the case w1 = w2
C1(n1;w1;n2;w2) = C1(n1;w1) ¤ªfn1 : n1 · min[q1=µH;N=2]g (13)
C2(n1;w1;n2;w2) = C2(n2;w2) ¤ªfn2 : n2 · min[q2=µH;N=2]g (14)
In these de¯nitions two points should be noted. First, it is assumed that the farm paying the
higher wage has an unlimited choice over the entire labour market. Whereas, the farm paying
the lower wage is constrained to hiring its labour from the pool of workers not wanted by the
high wage farm. The indicator function in equation (10) will be used to impose this restriction
in the de¯nition of the Nash equilibrium below. Secondly, when both farms attempt to pay a
common wage it is assumed that workers allocate themselves randomly across the two farms
making the supply to each farm equal to N=2.
De¯nition 2
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9In order to insure that the appropriate constraints are imposed in the minimization problem
b C = C + (1 ¡ ª)K is used where K is a very large positive number.
Aformal proof of existence of Nash equilibriadoes not appear to be feasible since Ci(ni;wi;nj;wj)
is not necessarily convex in (ni;wi). However, these equilibria do exist; inequalities (15) and
(16) do have solutions and they are generically unique, although they usually involve corner
solutions. As will be shown later, they often generate the same labour allocation as the corre-
sponding competitive equilibrium but wage rates that are usually lower.
Discussion continues within the framework of the two farm model. When q1=µH < N
and there is not enough labour for the largest farm the only possible competitive equilibrium
has @C1(n1;w¤¤)=@n1 = 0 and n1(q1;w¤¤) = N together with @C2(n2;w¤¤)=@n2 > 0, and
n2(q2;w¤¤) = 0.
However, this is not a Nash equilibrium. Since w¤¤ > ¹ w2 farm 1 only has to pay ¹ w2 to
attract the N high ability workers; consequently, ¹ w2 is the Nash equilibrium wage rate.
Suppose now that there is more high ability labour available and that q1=µH < N <
(q1 +q2)=µH. A competitive equilibrium exists with n1(q1;w¤¤) = q1=µH and 0 < n2(q2;w¤¤) =
N ¡ q1=µH < q2=µH. Like the ¯rst example this competitive equilibrium is not sustainable as
a Nash equilibrium either. De¯ne ^ w2 by the following condition:
C2(n2(q2; ^ w2); ^ w2) = C2(N ¡q1=µH;rH) (17)
Equation (17) de¯nes the wage rate at which farm 2 is indi®erent between employing
n2(q2; ^ w2) < q2=µH high ability workers at ^ w2 or employing the N ¡q1=µH residual high ability
workers which farm 1 does not want to employ together with some low ability workers both
at their respective reservation wage rates. Now ^ w2 is a Nash equilibrium. Here, the existence
of a Nash equilibrium is a relatively simple matter to demonstrate since the existence of ^ w2 is
guaranteed by the continuity of C2(n2(q2;w);w)) on the interval [rH; ¹ w2] and that is all that is
required.
If C1(q1=µH; ^ w2) < C1[N ¡n2(q2; ^ w2); ^ w2] the high ability labour allocation is the same as
it is in the competitive equilibrium, with farm 2 paying rH and farm 1 paying ^ w2 to high ability
workers. This case is shown in Figures 1A and 1B. If, on the other hand, C1(q1=µH; ^ w2) >
C1[N ¡ n2(q2; ^ w2); ^ w2] then farm 2 employs n2(q2; ^ w2) high ability workers at ^ w2 and farm 1
employs the residual, N ¡n2(q2; ^ w2), at rH.
FIGURES 1A AND 1B
10Both farms have lower total labour costs than they did under w¤¤ and neither farm has
any incentive to change its wage rate. For the labour allocation indicated in Figure 1 farm 2
has no incentive to increase its employment of high quality workers by setting a wage above
rH since that would raise its costs and paying a wage below ^ w2 would not attract high ability
workers away from farm 1. Likewise, farm 1 has no incentive to deviate from ^ w2 since this is
the lowest wage at which it only hires high ability workers and if it paid less than ^ w2 it would
end up with higher total costs employing N ¡n2(q2; ^ w2) high ability workers at rH.
What is, perhaps, surprising is that high ability workers on one of the farms are forced
to accept their reservation wages when identical workers on the other farm are earning ^ w2.
However, they have no bargaining power since an o®er of working for a wage less than ^ w2 would
be refused by farm 1 for the reasons outlined above. In this example the Nash equilibrium is
characterized by involuntary underemployment. It should be noted, moreover, that the presence
of involuntary underemployment is not restricted to the two farm example. Adding a third farm
to this example still leaves some high ability workers underemployed but they get ¹ w3 instead
of rH.
The characterization of Nash equilibrium when there are K farms turns out to be quite
complicated since there are a very large number of possible labour allocations. However, they
all appear to have the properties of the example above.
Also, there is some wage dispersion with a \pivotal farm" paying a wage rate to high ability
workers that is lower than the wage paid by farms specializing in high ability workers but above
rH.
So far the analysis has dealt with the case where s is a convex function of total employment.
When s is concave the results are quite di®erent. First, there are no competitive equilibria.
The concavity of s makes the cost function concave. Consequently, minimizing it leads to
a corner solution and the demand function for high ability labour for farm i, ni(qi;w) is a
discontinuous step function of w taking on the values 0 or qi=µH. Without the continuity of
demand functions there is little hope for the existence of a market clearing wage rate. On the
other hand Nash equilibria can exist and their characterization is a relatively simple task when
K = 2. Complexity grows exponentially with K so the analysis is restricted to the case where
there are only two farms.
When s is concave ¹ wi needs to be rede¯ned. It now must satisfy
rLqi=µL + s(qi=µL) = ¹ wiqi=µH +s(qi=µH) (18)
The meaning of ¹ wi is still the same: it is the highest wage at which farm i can employ high
ability labour. It is also the case that under reasonable assumptions d ¹ wi=dqi is negative.13 To
13If ¾() is the elasticity of s with respect to total employment then ¾() constant or a decreasing function is
su±cient to generate this result.
11describe Nash equilibria another de¯nition is needed.
rLqi=µL + s(qi=µL) = rL(qi ¡MµH)=µL + ¹ wi(M)M + s[(qi ¡MµH)=µL +M] (19)
for any M 2 [0;qi=µH]. Notice that ¹ wi(M) has the following properties: ¹ wi(M) is increasing in
M, ¹ wi(M) < ¹ wi, ¹ wi(qi=µH) = ¹ wi, and d¹ wi(M)=dqi < 0
Even when there are two farms the characteristics of the equilibrium depend on the rela-
tionship between N and fqig. There are three possible cases to be considered.
Case 1: 0 < N < q2=µH < q1=µH < (q1 + q2)=µH. Here there is only enough high ability
labour for the small farm so the only possible Nash equilibrium is n2 = N, w2 = ¹ w1(N) and
n1 = 0. ¹ w1(N) is the wage rate that makes farm 1 indi®erent between employing N high ability
workers at this wage or employing no high ability labour at all. ¹ w1(N) < ¹ w2(N) so farm 2 can
a®ord to pay this.
Case 2: 0 < q2=µH < N < q1=µH < (q1 + q2)=µH. With more than enough high ability
labour for farm 2 farm 1 can become a player. There are two possibilities. If w1(N) <
w2(q2=µH), n2 = q2=µH and w2 = ¹ w1(N) but n1 = N ¡q2=µH and w1 = rH. Farm 1 would like
to employ all N workers but it is prevented from doing this by farm 2 paying ¹ w1(N). It is left
with the residual, N ¡ q2=µH, which it pays rH. On the other hand, if w1(N) > w2(q2=µH),
then n2 = 0; w2 = rH, n1 = N; and w1 = w2(q2=µH): Farm 2 will be unable to prevent farm 1
from employing all of the high quality labour.
Case 3: 0 < q2=µH < q1=µH < N < (q1 +q2)=µH. Like case two there are two possibilities.
If w2(q2=µH) < w1(q1=µH), n1 = q1=µH, w1 = ¹ w2(q2=µH), n2 = N ¡ q1=µH, and w2 = rH.
Conversely, if w2(q2=µH) > w1(q1=µH), then n1 = N ¡ q2=µH, w1 = rH), n2 = q2=µH, and
w2 = w1(q1=µH)
Like the previous example in which the supervision cost function was convex high ability
workers on one of the farms are always involuntarily underemployed.
4 Comments and Discussion
This section starts with a brief summary of the properties of supervision cost models. While
both competitive and Nash equilibria were discussed it is the latter which deserve our attention.
While there may be a fairly large number of employers bidding for labour even in the slack season
it is quite clear that it is the farmers themselves who actually set wages. Since Nash behaviour
is a description of this process it seems to be more relevant than an abstract unspeci¯ed market
equilibrating process. The Nash equilibria display some wage dispersion, although most of it
is due to di®erences in ability. There are only three possible wages rates: reservation wages
12for low ability workers, premium wages for some high ability and a wage rate below that, but
possibly above rH, for the rest of the high ability workers. Premium wages have an interesting
property; they are higher than rLµH=µL, which is what high ability workers would be paid if
farmers priced high ability labour purely on arbitrage principles. However, numbers matter and
competition between farmers causes the wage to rise above this level. The model also makes
predictions about who works where, but that depends on the shape of the supervision cost
function. However, there is one property that the model does not have and that is there is no
involuntary unemployment.
But the generalization of the model mentioned in footnote 9 will permit this. One of the
simplifying assumptions of the model was that individual piece-rate productivities depended
only on individual ability and were not in°uenced by the rate, pi, paid per piece by farm i.
When this assumption is relaxed not only does the model become more realistic; it also has
equilibria that exhibit involuntary unemployment. To see the implications of this extension
suppose, to make the argument as simple as possible, that there is only one type of labour.
If, as before, farm i has qi tasks that have to be done and the number of tasks per day that




pi¹(µ;pi) ¸ r (21)
where qi=¹(µ;pi) is the number of workers employed and r is their common daily reservation
wage rate. When there is surplus labour and farm i can select its piece-rate it may want to pay
a piece-rate which gives workers a daily wage rate above the reservation wage rate. Workers
who are not employed can not bid the piece-rate down because farmers would have to pay
higher supervision costs and the piece-rate that they have chosen produces the right balance
between wage and supervision costs.
Notice, however, in the absence of supervision costs the optimal strategy is to pay the
equivalent of reservation wages by selecting pi which makes (28) hold with equality.
When there are two levels of ability and both types of worker produce more at higher
piece-rates the piece-rate for low ability workers will be higher than that which generates the
reservation daily wage rate leading to involuntary unemployment. Piece-rates for high ability
workers which are already higher than reservation piece-rates may be further increased because
of this e®ect.
On this issue there is, however, an important qualifying restriction. It has been assumed
that farms set piece rates but not the number of tasks that workers perform. If farmers have
13control over both of these then all workers will be forced to accept their reservation wages and
there will be no involuntary unemployment.
It was pointed out in the introduction that one of the one of the crucial issues in the
determination of employment decisions by farmers was the amount of information they had
on the workers that were available for hire. In this model farmers are assumed to know all
the characteristics of all workers. This may not be a particularly appropriate assumption in
all circumstances since the amount of information that farmers have concerning the abilities of
individuals in the work force is one of the more important answered question in the ¯eld. While
it is not clear what farmers actually know it is possible to model their actions when they have
varying amounts of information on their workers and to confront the predictions about wages
and employment that arise from these models with what is actually observed.
Consider what happens when ability can not be observed by farmers. When employers
know the distribution of ability the consequences of assuming the unobservability of µ have
been well understood since the classic Weiss (1980) contribution. Suppose, in contrast with the
model of the previous section, that ability is continuously distributed over the interval [µL;µH]
with a probability density function f(µ). If there is no way to distinguish between individuals
each farm must pay all of its workers the same wage. If wi is the wage o®ered by farm i, the





and is generated by a random sample drawn from those workers whose reservation wage is no
greater than wi. Farms choose wi by minimizing14
wiqi=¹ µ(wi)+ s(qi=¹ µ(wi)) (23)
When there are K farms there are K di®erent wage rates. This is, in fact, a dominant
strategy Nashequilibrium since each farm can select its cost minimizing wage rate independently
of what other farms do. Farm i selects a random sample of workers from the set of workers
who are willing to work for wi. Since this sampling is random the distribution of ability is
unchanged by farm i0s action and all of the other farms are free to do what they wish. Like
the previous case workers who do not get jobs can not bid the wage rate down so there is
involuntary unemployment. In this case, however, supervision costs are not needed to obtain
the result.
There are three features of this model which are di±cult to reconcile with what is actually
observed in terms of traditional wage payments systems. First, while there may be some
14As Wiess (1980 p. 530) notes, this is an approximation since no account is taken of the fact that farm i
0s
average productivity di®ers from ¹ µ(wi) by a sampling error.
14instances where wages are farm speci¯c this appears not the norm in most casual labour markets.
Secondly, there are no wage premiums paid to the high ability workers and it may be the case
that the wage is too low to attract the highest quality workers. Finally, the model makes no
prediction as to who gets work since the employer has no way to determine who the best workers
are.
There is one feature of the model that might appear restrictive to some readers and that
is the inelasticity of demand for labour. In all versions of the model qi is a constant and, in
particular, it does not depend on the wage or piece-rate that farm i has to pay. This assumption
is designed to capture the reality of the situation. In the slack season certain tasks have to be
performed at certain times otherwise there will be no crop at harvest time. Farmers have very
little °exibility and the constancy of qi re°ects that.
Finally, the models of the previous section allowed individuals with di®erent ability levels
to earn di®erent piece-rates. If piece-rate were constrained to be equal across ability levels then
this would require wH=wL = µH=µL. Since wL = rL this means that all farms pay the same wage
rate to high ability workers. This is certainly not a property of any of the equilibria discussed
above. When farmers have to pay supervision costs they have an incentive to pay premium
wages to better workers and would pay di®erential piece-rates provided this was acceptable
within the norms of village society.
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